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Trial TacTics
In a decision announced November 29, 2012, the Oregon Supreme Court reconsidered, after 30 years, the role that trial judges must play in 
Oregon courts to screen eyewitness identification. 
The case, State v. Lawson, 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012), 
actually consolidated two separate criminal appeals 
in order to broadly consider eyewitness identifica-
tions. The first defendant, Samuel Adam Lawson, 
was convicted of five counts of aggravated murder, 
three counts of attempted aggravated murder, and 
two counts of first-degree robbery (State v. Lawson); 
the second defendant, Stanley Dale James Jr., was 
convicted of second-degree robbery, harassment, 
and third-degree theft (State v. James).
The Facts of Lawson
The facts of  Lawson illustrate the problems eye-
witnesses often have in making identifications. On 
August 21, 2003, Noris and Sherl Hilde drove with 
their trailer to a campsite where  Noris had pitched a 
tent the prior weekend to claim the spot. They found 
Lawson in the tent and his yellow truck parked in 
their parking space. Lawson apologized, saying he 
thought the tent was abandoned; he then moved to 
a nearby vacant campsite.
Later that evening, as she stood at the window of 
the trailer, Sherl was shot in the chest with a large 
caliber hunting rifle. Noris, was then shot and killed 
while trying to call 911. When the 911 dispatcher 
called back, Sherl told the dispatcher that she and 
her husband were shot and that she did not know 
who shot them, but “they” (the shooter or shoot-
ers) wanted the Hildes’ truck. Emergency personnel 
found Sherl lying in the trailer in critical condition, 
and transported her via ambulance and helicop-
ter to a hospital. An ambulance attendant said she 
was hysterical and continued to refer to the shooter 
as “they,” but also said the shooter was the man at 
their campsite; she even claimed that the pilot of 
the helicopter was the shooter. At the hospital, she 
immediately went into surgery.
Two days later, the police attempted to interview 
Sherl while she was heavily medicated with her hands 
restrained to keep her from removing a breathing 
tube. Unable to speak, she could respond to ques-
tions only by moving her head. The police showed 
her a black-and-white photo line-up that included 
a picture of the defendant, who had volunteered to 
police that he encountered the couple the day they 
were shot. Sherl indicated she could not identify any 
photo, but she nodded “yes” to three leading ques-
tions: Had she seen the shooter earlier in the day? 
Had the shooter been in the Hildes’ tent? Did the 
shooter drive a yellow truck?
Two weeks later, the police again interviewed 
Sherl at the hospital. This time, she could speak and 
told the police that the shooter entered the trailer 
after her husband was shot, but she could not see 
the man because it was dark and he put a pillow 
over her face. She was apologetic that she could not 
be more helpful to the police, but she did not think 
she could identify anyone. About two weeks after 
that, Sherl was again interviewed and told the police 
that, despite the pillow over her face, she briefly saw 
the shooter though she was still unable to pick him 
out of a photo line-up. She added that the perpe-
trator was wearing a dark shirt and a baseball cap, 
but did not indicate he was the same man who had 
been in their tent.
In an interview a week later, Sherl reviewed her 
answers to the leading questions she had been asked 
at the first interview. She had no recollection of the 
interview, but for the first time told the police that 
she believed the shooter was the man who had been 
in their tent earlier in the day. She stated she could 
not “swear to it” and did not think she could pick 
him out of a line-up. The police told her the man she 
identified was Samuel Lawson and he was in custody.
Later, while convalescing, a rehabilitation worker 
showed Sherl a newspaper with a photograph of 
Lawson that identified him as the suspect arrested 
for the shootings. Then, about a month before trial, 
and two years after the shootings, police investi-
gators showed her a single photograph of Lawson 
wearing a dark shirt and a dark hat with white let-
tering and took her to a pretrial hearing where she 
observed him. Inadvertently, Sherl then came upon 
one of the previous photographic line-ups she had 
been shown. This time, she identified Lawson as the 
shooter, and went on to testify at his trial that Law-
son was the shooter. The trial judge denied a motion 
to exclude the identification.
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 Trial TacTics
The Facts of James
In James, Officer Gomez arrived at a local Safe-
way in response to a morning theft complaint. He 
discovered that the thieves were gone and inter-
viewed employees who gave a description of two 
suspects that Gomez included in an incident report. 
One store clerk said he heard the “clanging” of bot-
tles and then came upon a “large Indian” and a 
“small Indian” stuffing 40-ounce bottles of  beer 
into a backpack. The clerk reported this to a man-
ager, identified the two men as they were leaving, 
and the two Safeway employees pursued the men 
while yelling for them to stop. The smaller man left 
the store while the larger man blocked the exit. The 
store clerk tried to get around the larger man, and 
the larger man resisted and punched the manager as 
he swung at the clerk and missed. The two suspects 
ran across the parking lot and drove away.
The employees described the larger man as approxi-
mately 220 pounds, wearing a white tank top and baggy 
blue jeans, and the smaller man as approximately five 
feet tall, 110 pounds, and wearing a long black coat 
with a hood, baggy blue pants, and a backpack.
Later that day, Gomez observed two men who 
matched the descriptions. He approached the two, 
both of whom appeared intoxicated, and they denied 
having been at the Safeway. Gomez obtained consent 
to search one man’s backpack and discovered one 
unopened 40-ounce bottle of Steel Reserve 211 malt 
liquor and a denim jacket. Gomez obtained consent 
to take both men to the Safeway, where they were 
identified by the clerk and manager. Gomez testi-
fied at a suppression hearing almost two years later 
that he said something like “Is this them?” before the 
Safeway employees made the identification.
The trial judge denied a motion to suppress the 
out-of-court and in-court identifications. The Ore-
gon Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Old law
The lower courts relied upon State v. Classen, 590 
P.2d 1198 (Or. 1979), in making their rulings. That 
decision established a two-step process for evalu-
ating identifications. First, the judge must decide 
whether the underlying identification process had 
either been suggestive or needlessly departed from 
procedures designed to avoid such suggestiveness. If  
so, the judge must then decide (1) whether the witness 
had based the identification at issue on an indepen-
dent source separate from the suggestive elements, or 
(2) whether other aspects of the identification sub-
stantially excluded the risk that it had been influenced 
by the suggestive elements. In the second step, judges 
could consider, inter alia, five factors: (1) the oppor-
tunity that the witness had to clearly view the persons 
involved in the crime; (2) the attention that he or she 
gave to their identifying features; (3) the timing and 
completeness of the description given by the witness 
after the event; (4) the degree of certainty expressed 
by the witness in describing the persons involved in 
the crime and making subsequent identifications; and 
(5) the lapse of time between the original observation 
and the subsequent identification.
The Classen court relied on the US Supreme 
Court’s 1977 decision in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 
U.S. 98, for these factors and for the proposition that 
reliability was the linchpin in determinations regard-
ing the admissibility of identification testimony, but 
decided the case on the basis of Oregon evidence law 
rather than under the due process clause.
Lawson and Evidence law
The Lawson court observed that the most recent 
United States Supreme Court case on identifica-
tions emphasized the role that state evidence law can 
play in excluding unreliable identifications. (Perry 
v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 181 (2012).) It 
explained that much had changed since its 1979 
Classen decision:
Since 1979—the year that this court decided 
Classen—there have been more than 2,000 sci-
entific studies conducted on the reliability of 
eyewitness identification. Amici curiae in these 
two cases—particularly the Innocence Net-
work and a group of academics and university 
professors who have conducted, published, and 
reviewed a wide range of  scientific research 
on the subject of eyewitness identification—
submitted extensive data and analysis to this 
court regarding many of those studies. Based 
on our extensive review of the current scien-
tific research and literature, we conclude that 
the scientific knowledge and empirical research 
concerning eyewitness perception and memory 
has progressed sufficiently to warrant taking 
judicial notice of the data contained in those 
various sources as legislative facts that we may 
consult for assistance in determining the effec-
tiveness of our existing test for the admission 
of eyewitness identification evidence.
(Lawson, 291 P.3d at 685.)
The court explained that it found in the research 
that the factors affecting the reliability of identifi-
cations can be grouped in two categories: system 
variables and estimator variables.
System variables refer to the circumstances sur-
rounding the identification procedure itself that 
are generally within the control of those admin-
istering the procedure. Estimator variables, by 
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contrast, generally refer to characteristics of the 
witness, the alleged perpetrator, and the envi-
ronmental conditions of the event that cannot 
be manipulated or adjusted by state actors.
(Id.)
The court identified the system variables as blind 
administration, pre-identification instructions, line-up 
construction, simultaneous versus sequential line-ups, 
show-ups, multiple viewings, suggestive question-
ing, co-witness and other contamination, suggestive 
feedback, and recording confidence. It identified the 
estimator variables as stress, witness attention, dura-
tion of exposure, environmental viewing conditions, 
witness characteristics and conditions, description, 
perpetrator characteristics, speed of identification, 
level of certainty, and memory decay.
Considering all of  these variables, the court 
concluded that Classen failed to ensure that only 
sufficiently reliable identifications are admitted. It 
reasoned that the Classen first step conflated evi-
dentiary principles with due process analysis and 
that under state evidence law “there is no reason 
to hinder the analysis of eyewitness reliability with 
purposeless distinctions between suggestiveness and 
other sources of unreliability.” (Id. at 688–89.) The 
court explained that “[w]hen a criminal defendant 
has challenged the admissibility of eyewitness identi-
fication evidence by an appropriate pretrial motion, 
the manner in which Classen apportions the bur-
den of proof in identification matters reflects more 
concern for due process principles than principles 
of evidence law.” (Id. at 689.) This is because it is 
the defendant who must allege a constitutional vio-
lation. In contrast, it is the proponent of evidence 
such as identifications who normally bears the ini-
tial burden of establishing admissibility.
The court also recognized problems with the sec-
ond step in Classen because  trial courts applying the 
Classen factors  rely heavily on the eyewitnesses’ self-
reports regarding suggestibility, whereas there was 
persuasive evidence to show that suggestive proce-
dures can inflate the self-reported evidence regarding 
suggestiveness factors.
Problems and Necessity
The court recognized both the problems with eye-
witness identification as well as its importance. As 
for the problems, the court wrote:
[I]n Classen, this court acknowledged that “exten-
sive research and commentary by psychologists 
and jurists on the dangers of misidentification 
and ways to minimize them stretches back at 
least half a century” and “that the unreliabil-
ity of eyewitness identification under suggestive 
circumstances is widely recognized.” That said, 
a perfect solution to the problem of misidenti-
fication has thus far eluded us, a difficulty that 
may lie in the fact that, while empirical evidence 
suggests that a certain percentage of eyewitness 
identifications are incorrect, we often have no 
way to determine whether or not a particular 
eyewitness is accurate in identifying a specific 
individual. As we previously observed, although 
the scientific studies we have reviewed have iden-
tified a number of factors that contribute to the 
likelihood of mistaken identification, nearly all 
of those factors are probabilistic in nature—
they can indicate only a statistical likelihood of 
misidentification within a broad population of 
people studied, not whether any one identifica-
tion is right or wrong.
(Id. at 690 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).)
As for the importance of  such testimony, the 
court wrote that “[d]espite those shortcomings, eye-
witness evidence can be extremely probative of guilt 
and, in many cases, may be the only evidence con-
necting a guilty defendant to a crime.” (Id.) The 
court concluded that “[t]herefore, we must attempt 
to strike a proper balance between the utility of that 
evidence in convicting the guilty and its proclivity, 
on occasion, to inculpate the innocent.” (Id.)
The solution
The court turned for a solution to the Oregon Evi-
dence Code (OEC). It stated that, when a defendant 
makes a pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness 
identification, judges should recognize that such 
identification will almost always be relevant under 
OEC 401 (similar to Federal Rule of  Evidence 
(FRE) 401), but that OEC 602 and 701 (similar to 
FRE 602 and 701) become important. OEC 602 
requires that the proponent of eyewitness identifi-
cation “must offer evidence showing both that the 
witness had an adequate opportunity to observe or 
otherwise personally perceive the facts to which the 
witness will testify, and did, in fact, observe or per-
ceive them, thereby gaining personal knowledge of 
the facts.” (Lawson, 291 P.3d at 692.)
OEC 701, the court ruled, requires the following:
[T]he first part of an OEC 701 inquiry requires 
that the trial court initially consider what the 
witness actually perceived (essentially, the 
OEC 602 inquiry described above), and then 
determine whether the witness’s identifica-
tion of the defendant was “rationally based” 
on those perceptions. To satisfy its burden, 
the proponent of the identification evidence 
(generally the state) must demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the wit-
ness perceived sufficient facts to support an 
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inference of identification and that the identifi-
cation was, in fact, based on those perceptions.
Initially, the proponent of the evidence must 
establish that the witness could make a ratio-
nal inference of identification from the facts 
that the witness actually perceived. Human 
facial features will ordinarily be sufficiently 
distinctive to serve as a rational basis for an 
inference of identification. Thus, a witness who 
got a clear look at the perpetrator’s face could 
rationally base a subsequent identification on 
a comparison of  facial features, even if  the 
witness was unable to verbally communicate 
every specific similarity between the two faces.
Conversely, nonfacial features like race, height, 
weight, clothing, or hair color, generally lack 
the level of  distinction necessary to permit 
the witness to identify a specific person as the 
person whom the witness saw. If, for example, 
a witness testified to observing a tall, dark-
haired man of medium build from behind as 
he ran from the scene of the crime, the trial 
court permissibly could find that the witness 
had personal knowledge of the height, build, 
clothing, and hair color of the perpetrator, but 
no more, and limit the testimony accordingly.
When a witness’s perceptions are capable of 
supporting an inference of identification, but 
are nevertheless met with competing evidence 
of an impermissible basis for that inference—
i.e., suggestive police procedures—an issue 
of fact arises as to whether the witness’s sub-
sequent identification was derived from a 
permissible or impermissible basis. When there 
are facts demonstrating that a witness could 
have relied on something other than his or her 
own perceptions to identify the defendant, the 
state—as the proponent of the identification—
must establish by a preponderance of  the 
evidence that the identification was based on 
a permissible basis rather than an impermis-
sible one, such as suggestive police procedures.
(Lawson, 291 P.3d at 693.)
The court added that the eyewitness testimony 
must be helpful to the jury, which it usually will be, but:
it is conceivable that some statements of identifi-
cation might not be particularly helpful to a jury. 
Consider, for example, the witness who observes 
a masked perpetrator with prominently scarred 
or tattooed hands. Although those features could 
be distinctive enough to provide a rational basis 
for an inference of identification, a jury may be 
equally capable of making the same inference 
by comparing the witness’s description of those 
markings to objective evidence of the actual 
markings on the defendant.
(Id.)
The court added that a trial judge must consider 
whether the probative value of identification evi-
dence is substantially outweighed by dangers of 
unfair prejudice, and “in cases in which an eye-
witness has been exposed to suggestive police 
procedures, trial courts have a heightened role as an 
evidentiary gatekeeper because ‘traditional’ methods 
of testing reliability—like cross-examination—can 
be ineffective at discrediting unreliable or inaccu-
rate eyewitness identification evidence.” (Id. at 695.)
The court pointed out the potential importance 
of expert testimony:
Because many of the system and estimator 
variables that we described earlier are either 
unknown to the average juror or contrary 
to common assumptions, expert testimony 
is one method by which the parties can edu-
cate the trier of fact concerning variables that 
can affect the reliability of eyewitness identi-
fication. Expert testimony may also provide 
an avenue to introduce and explain scientific 
research or other indicia of reliability not spe-
cifically addressed by our opinion in these cases. 
In that regard, the use of experts may prove 
vital to ensuring that the law keeps pace with 
advances in scientific knowledge, thus enabling 
judges and jurors to evaluate eyewitness iden-
tification testimony according to relevant and 
meaningful criteria. Of course, expert testimony 
must be predicated on scientific research; must 
meet the threshold admissibility requirements 
for scientific evidence; and must be relevant to 
a disputed issue in the case, such that the testi-
mony will assist the jury in resolving that issue.
(Id. at 696 (citation omitted).)
Having set forth a new approach to eyewitness 
testimony, the court predicted:
that the trial courts will continue to admit 
most eyewitness identifications. . . . because, 
although possible, it is doubtful that issues 
concerning one or more of  the estimator 
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variables that we have identified will, without 
more, be enough to support an inference of 
unreliability sufficient to justify the exclusion 
of the eyewitness identification.
(Id. at 697.)
conclusion
In Lawson, the court reversed and remanded for a 
new trial and stated that “the parties must be per-
mitted on retrial to (1) supplement the record with 
any additional evidence that may bear on the reli-
ability of the eyewitness identifications at issue here, 
and (2) present arguments regarding the appropri-
ate application of  the new procedures set out in 
this opinion.” (Id. at 698–99.) In James, the court 
“conclude[d] that, unlike Lawson, application of 
the revised test that we have established here could 
not have resulted in the exclusion of the eyewitness 
identification evidence” and accordingly affirmed 
the conviction. (Id. at 699.)
Other state courts have expressed concern about 
the dangers of erroneous convictions based on eye-
witness identifications. One example cited by the 
Oregon Supreme Court is the opinion of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 
872 (N.J. 2011), together with the report of the spe-
cial master engaged in that case.
Footnote 5 of  Lawson highlights that court’s 
concern: “Eyewitness misidentification has con-
tributed to date to 72 percent of the 301 wrongful 
convictions revealed by DNA evidence.” (Lawson, 
291 P.3d at 690 n.5 (citing Facts on Post-Convic-
tion DNA Exonerations, Innocence Project, http://
tinyurl.com/25frwdr (last visited Apr. 14, 2013); 
Brandon L. Garrett, convIctInG the Innocent: 
Where crImInaL ProsecutIons Go WronG 48 
(2011) (reporting that 76 percent of  the first 250 
convictions overturned due to DNA evidence since 
1989 involved eyewitness misidentification)).)
Prosecutors, along with judges and defense 
lawyers, desire to prevent wrongful convictions, 
including those based on eyewitness identification. 
The hope is that all concerned will cooperate in state 
experiments that might lead to better investigative 
procedures and judicial controls that will reduce the 
danger of convicting the innocent. n
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